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A FEDERAL ANTI-SLAPP LAW WOULD MAKE SECTION
230(c)(1) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
MORE EFFECTIVE
Sharp-Wasserman/Mascagni ∗
INTRODUCTION
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 1
(“CDA 230”) is the legal linchpin of the modern web. CDA 230
shields the operators of websites of the user-driven content model
from liability imposed upon them, through litigation or other
means, for the unlawful speech or conduct of their users. In
application, CDA 230 enables these defendant intermediaries to
dismiss such suits before trial. This provision has been applied to
various causes of action and criminal charges, including
defamation, 2 false advertising, 3 housing discrimination,4 and a
state criminal charge of ticket-scalping. 5
A wide variety of website operators benefit from this
immunity in their regular operations, from large companies like
Twitter and Reddit to thousands of smaller discussion websites,
blogs and other sites that host third-party content. CDA 230
immunity enables such defendants to function as hosts of thirdparty speech, and more broadly, as conduits of internet
commerce.
The law is motivated, in part, by the common law theory
of collateral censorship. 6 This theory is constituted, first, by a
judgment of fact: were intermediaries held liable for all illegal
content contained within a vast quantity of third-party speech,
intermediaries (like bookstores, newsstands, or social media
sites) would respond by reducing the amount of speech they
transmit and, erring on the side of minimizing litigation costs, by
censoring some lawful speech that merely might be tortious.
Collateral censorship theory incorporates, second, a judgment of
∗
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1
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
2
See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, L.L.C., 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir.
2014).
3
See, e.g., Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
4
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008).
5
See, e.g., Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 229–30 (2012).
6
Several landmark CDA 230 cases have embraced this interpretation. See, e.g., Batzel
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
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value: in the context of lawsuits that implicate freedom of speech
concerns, as the volume of third-party content increases and the
practicability of editorial control over content accordingly
decreases, the affirmative responsibility of an intermediary to
determine the tortious nature of such content should be relaxed. 7
For instance, under the common law, newsstands are liable only
for defamatory content of which they have specific notice, 8 while
newspaper publishers are subject to the same standard of
defamation liability as the authors of articles. 9
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and
state anti-SLAPP laws have different scopes of application but
serve similar First Amendment-related purposes. Anti-SLAPP
laws are designed with the intention of mitigating the speechchilling effect of litigation costs; but anti-SLAPP laws are not
confined in their application to the internet or to intermediary
liability.
Anti-SLAPP laws provide for the expedited dismissal of
meritless suits that are intended to chill the exercise of speech—
“Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,” or
“SLAPPs.” 10 The object of such a meritless suit is often to silence
someone or to force a defendant to spend money, and not
necessarily to obtain a favorable result at trial. A classic example
of a SLAPP is a lawsuit by a public figure against a newspaper
or blog for a critical opinion article. 11
Anti-SLAPP laws protect against suits that arise from
First Amendment-related activity on the part of the defendant,
such as, in the broadest anti-SLAPP statutes, any public
statements on matters of public concern. 12 Anti-SLAPP statutes
7

See Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 296–97, 300 (2011); see also Julio Sharp-Wasserman,
Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act and the Common Law of
Defamation: A Convergence Thesis, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 195, 206 (2019).
8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. d, e (AM. L. INST. 1977).
9
Id. § 578 cmt. b.
10
The term “SLAPP” was coined by Professors George Pring and Penelope Canan
in a pair of articles they co-authored in 1988. See Penelope Canan & George W.
Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and
Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 385 (1988); Penelope Canan & George W.
Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506 (1988). They
articulated the definition also in their 1996 book, GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE
CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 8–9 (1996).
11
See, e.g., Trump v. Chi. Tribune Co., 616 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (libel suit
against a newspaper by a celebrity real estate developer in response to an article
describing one of the developer’s buildings as “an atrocious, ugly monstrosity”).
12
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West 2018) (defining protected
activity as “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest”); D.C. CODE
§ 16-5502(b) (2018) (defining protected activity as “an act in furtherance of the
right of advocacy on issues of public interest”); T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
27.001(3) (2018) (defining protected activity as “a communication made in
connection with a matter of public concern”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041(i)(3)
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permit defendants to file a motion for expedited dismissal, upon
which a pre-trial hearing must be held within a statutorily
defined time period. If the suit is determined at that hearing to
be meritless, it is dismissed, with costs imposed on the plaintiff.
If one were to draw a Venn diagram of the scope of application
of these two laws, the outer circles would contain a substantial
number of applications exclusive to each law. Anti-SLAPP laws
have, in some senses, a broader application than CDA 230. First,
anti-SLAPP protection often applies in both an online and an
offline context. Second, anti-SLAPP laws protect defendants of
all kinds—including newspapers, activists, and consumer
reviewers—and not just intermediaries. Anti-SLAPP cases
involving CDA 230 represent only a small subset of anti-SLAPP
cases.
But the scope of anti-SLAPP laws is also, in another
sense, narrower than that of CDA 230. While CDA 230, with
certain exemptions, immunizes intermediaries against any cause
of action holding an intermediary liable for any type of thirdparty conduct, anti-SLAPP laws are intended to protect
defendants only from lawsuits that target speech or petitioning
activity that implicates First Amendment concerns. Thus, CDA
230 immunity has been applied in the context of liability for
housing discrimination, false advertising, and other causes of
action that are less likely to fall under the purview of anti-SLAPP
statutes. 13 This difference is a reflection of the fact that CDA 230
was drafted, like anti-SLAPP laws, with the narrow intention of
protecting freedom of speech, but also, unlike anti-SLAPP laws,
with the broader aim of facilitating the growth of internet
commerce. 14
Anti-SLAPP statutes differ from CDA 230 not just in
scope, but also in that the former commonly provide certain
procedural features that specifically address the problem of pretrial costs, such as a fee-shifting mechanism that imposes the
(2018) (defining protected activity as “any written or oral statement concerning an
issue of public interest made in a public forum or a place open to the public”). For an
overview of state anti-SLAPP statutes, see State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB.
PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speechprotection/#4 (last visited May 7, 2019).
13
See Park v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., 393 P.3d 905, 911 (Cal. 2017)
(“[W]hile discrimination may be carried out by means of speech, such as a written
notice of termination, and an illicit animus may be evidenced by speech, neither
circumstance transforms a discrimination suit to one arising from speech. What gives
rise to liability is not that the defendant spoke, but that the defendant denied the
plaintiff a benefit, or subjected the plaintiff to a burden, on account of a
discriminatory or retaliatory consideration.”). For a discussion of the commercial
speech exemption and its application to false advertising claims, see Part VII(c).
14
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation[.]”).
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defendant’s costs on the plaintiff upon dismissal, 15 time limits for
scheduling a pre-trial hearing, 16 and a stay of discovery pending
a decision on the anti-SLAPP motion. 17
The lack of such mechanisms in CDA 230 partly
undermines the law’s intended effect, because as detailed in a
2012 study, intermediaries face significant costs even in litigating
a case up to the motion to dismiss stage at which CDA 230
questions are typically adjudicated. 18 Lawsuits do not have to be
successful or even reach trial to set in motion the process of
collateral censorship, because the relevant incentives are
triggered by aversion to costs, not only by aversion to
unfavorable ultimate legal determinations.
But a defendant can apply the laws in concert in some
circumstances. California case law illustrates that CDA 230 can
be employed in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, so that the
latter’s protections supplement the former’s. 19 A defendant
argues that a suit is meritless due to the applicability of a CDA
230 defense, and thus should be dismissed promptly, with costs.
Unfortunately, the absence of a federal anti-SLAPP law allows
plaintiffs to avoid this fortified combination of defenses,
available in some state courts, in four ways. First, because some
state anti-SLAPP laws offer broader protection than others,
plaintiffs can engage in forum-shopping among state courts.
Second, in cases in which a plaintiff’s state affords narrower antiSLAPP protection than the defendant’s state, choice-of-law
principles for cross-jurisdictional tort actions will tend to favor
law of the plaintiff’s state. Third, because state anti-SLAPP rules
generally do not apply to federal claims, plaintiffs can plead
analogous federal claims. Fourth, plaintiffs can exploit a federal
circuit split over the question of whether state anti-SLAPP rules
apply in federal diversity cases.
A Federal anti-SLAPP law would largely close these
loopholes. But even with the external fortification provided by a
federal anti-SLAPP law, there are limitations to this combined
defense, rooted both in inherent limitations to CDA 230
immunity and to the imperfect overlap between the two types of
immunity. First, the scope of CDA 230 immunity can be
narrowed by Congress and the courts, and such judicial and
15

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 165504(a) (2018); T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.009(a)(1) (West 2018).
16
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2018); T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 27.004(a) (West 2018).
17
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 16-5502(c)(1)
(2018); T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(c) (West 2018).
18
David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 42 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 373, 411 (2010).
19
See infra Part IV.
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legislative reform simultaneously reduces the scope of antiSLAPP protection in CDA 230 cases. Second, the definition of
protected activity in a federal anti-SLAPP statute inevitably
would not encompass all situations in which CDA 230 applies.
Specifically, while anti-SLAPP statutes with the broadest
definitions of protected activity typically protect only speech on
“matters of public concern,” 20 CDA 230 applies even to speech
concerning matters of interest only to the litigants or to a small
subset of the public. Finally, a federal anti-SLAPP law, unlike
CDA 230, likely would have a commercial speech exemption,
designed to prevent the abuse of anti-SLAPP protection by
corporate defendants, primarily in the context of false advertising
litigation. This exemption would preclude the use of a federal
anti-SLAPP defense in some cases in which CDA 230 would
apply.
This Article proceeds in eight parts. Part I details the text,
legislative purpose, and prevailing judicial interpretation of CDA
230. Part II explains the relevance of pre-trial costs to the
problem of collateral censorship in an online context. Part III
details the history and general characteristics of state antiSLAPP laws. Part IV illustrates how a CDA 230 defense can be
employed in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion. Part V
examines gaps in state anti-SLAPP coverage. Part VI outlines
the features of a hypothetical federal anti-SLAPP law and
explains how a federal anti-SLAPP law would close existing
gaps in the existing anti-SLAPP regime. Part VII details
limitations to a combined CDA 230/anti-SLAPP defense at the
federal level. Part VIII briefly discusses the unfeasibility and
relative undesirability of the alternative solution of adding a feeshifting provision to CDA 230 itself.
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT
A. The Text
Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act
states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.” 21 The category “Interactive Computer Service” in
application covers, importantly, websites of the user-generated
content model. More broadly, the term is defined to include “any
information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
20
21

See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 12.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).
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computer server.” 22 “Information Content Provider” is defined
as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part,
for the creation or development of information . . . .” 23
For instance, while one can sue a Yelp commenter for
defamation, although the commenter has provided content to
Yelp, one cannot hold Yelp liable for that content unless one can
demonstrate that Yelp itself somehow co-authored it. Under
existing judicial standards, a plaintiff cannot bypass CDA 230
immunity with an allegation that Yelp has neglectfully permitted
illegal speech or conduct originating with third-parties, 24 or with
an allegation that Yelp has encouraged third party speech or
conduct in some sense short of co-authorship. 25 Yelp must be an
author or co-author of the content; more precisely, Yelp must
have authored the illegal aspect of the content. For example, in
a defamation context, Yelp does not lose immunity with respect
to certain content by “correcting spelling, removing obscenity or
trimming for length,” but it does lose immunity by editing “in a
manner that contributes to the alleged illegality,” such as
removing the word “not” from a third-party message reading
“[Name] did not steal the artwork,” 26 because by removing
“not,” Yelp potentially transforms a legally permissible
statement into a defamatory one.
As courts have interpreted the provision, § 230(c)(1)
provides online intermediaries with broad protection against
censorship on the basis of the third-party origins of content.
Under current judicial doctrine, this immunity applies regardless
of whether a defendant has taken any steps to censor
objectionable content. 27 Defendants also benefit from immunity
22

Id. § 230(f)(2).
Id. § 230(f)(3).
24
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff
cannot sue someone for publishing third-party content simply by changing the name
of the theory from defamation to negligence.”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,
422 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that CDA 230 preempted a negligence claim premised
on the theory that a social media site had a duty to implement certain safety features
to prevent minors from interacting with sexual predators through the platform).
25
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157, 1174–75
(9th Cir. 2008) (“Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close
cases where a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did
encouraged the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of
immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death
by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or
at least tacitly assented to—the illegality of third parties. Where it is very clear that
the website directly participates in developing the alleged illegality . . . immunity will
be lost. But in cases of enhancement by implication or development by inference . . .
section 230 must be interpreted to protect websites not merely from ultimate liability,
but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.”).
26
Id. at 1169.
27
See Danielle C. Keats & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 408–11 (2017) (arguing for the
23
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even when they have specific notice that third-party content is
unlawful. 28
This Article focuses on § 230(c)(1), rather than (c)(2),
which has different prerequisites for its application and is a much
less significant area of CDA 230 litigation. Section 230(c)(2)
states that
[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of any
action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the
provider or user considers to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally
protected; or any action taken to
enable
or
make
available
to information content providers or
others the technical means to
restrict access to material described
in paragraph (1). 29
Sub-section (c)(2) uniquely applies only to defendants
who have made an effort to screen out objectionable content.
Moreover, unlike § 230(c)(1), sub-section (c)(2) does not limit
immunity based on whether the plaintiff’s cause of action is
premised on the defendant being a “publisher or speaker,” or on
whether the defendant is an “information content provider” with
respect to the content that is the subject of the suit. 30
B. CDA 230’s Narrow and Broad Aims: Freedom of Speech and
Freedom of Commerce
CDA 230(c)(1), at least according to the dominant
judicial interpretation, is intended to foster an online free
marketplace of ideas by preventing collateral censorship. 31 The
contrary interpretation of CDA 230, while noting the unanimity of precedent against
their interpretation).
28
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
29
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018).
30
See IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 37.05(4)(A) (2017).
31
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099–110 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The
statute is designed at once ‘to promote the free exchange of information and ideas
over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or
obscene material.’”); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Consistent with these provisions, courts construing § 230 have recognized as
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common law theory of collateral censorship posits that imposing
strict liability for third party speech—that is, liability without a
knowledge requirement—on a “distributor,” or an entity that
transmits large quantities of third-party speech, will cause that
entity to overzealously censor out of caution, catching even
lawful content in its net. Under common law doctrine,
“distributors” are held liable only for third-party illegality of
which they have specific knowledge. For example, bookstores
and newsstands are not liable for defamatory content in books
and newspapers, except where the plaintiff can show that such
intermediaries specifically knew of the defamatory speech at
issue. 32 Newspapers, by contrast, are held liable by the same
standard as the authors of articles. 33 This logic can be applied to
any form of criminal or civil liability in which intermediary
liability would cause an intermediary to preemptively censor the
speech of third parties, such as liability under obscenity laws or
in the context of lawsuits alleging defamation or privacy torts.
In addition to permitting a free market of ideas and
preferences for ideas, the statute is supposed to foster internet
commerce more broadly.34 The statute provides a policy
objective to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that currently exists for . . . interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” 35 The application of
CDA 230 to activities that do not implicate First Amendment
Concerns, such as selling goods and services, or that are subject
to more limited First Amendment protections, such as
advertising goods and services, 36 is justifiable, if at all, in
furtherance of this more general aim. In a sense, the mechanics
of collateral censorship as an empirical phenomenon may
operate similarly with respect to such activity in user-driven
internet media, but such “censorship” does not raise the same
Constitutional and policy concerns.
critical in applying the statute the concern that lawsuits could threaten the freedom of
speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. . . . Making interactive
computer services and their users liable for the speech of third parties would severely
restrict the information available on the Internet. Section 230 therefore sought to
prevent lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services on the Internet.”)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to
discern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of
speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability
on service providers for the communications of others represented, for Congress,
simply another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was
enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and,
accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.”).
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. d, e (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
33
Id. § 578 cmt. b.
34
See Sharp-Wasserman, supra note 7, at 205.
35
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
36
See infra Part VII(c).
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The distinction between these narrower and broader aims
is crucial to understanding the imperfect overlap, discussed in
Part VII, between CDA 230 and a federal anti-SLAPP law.
Because anti-SLAPP laws are designed to discourage and
mitigate the impact of lawsuits targeting speech and petitioning
activity specifically, no anti-SLAPP law can or should apply in
all cases in which a CDA 230 defense is available. Anti-SLAPP
laws are not general instruments of tort reform and do not serve
to facilitate freedom of commerce except where freedom of
speech concerns are simultaneously implicated.
II. PRE-TRIAL COSTS AND COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP DESPITE
CDA 230 IMMUNITY
Despite the powerful protections CDA 230 provides to
defendants on the merits, it has, as a practical matter, only
partially fulfilled its promise of preventing collateral censorship
by mitigating the litigation costs borne by online intermediaries.
CDA 230 immunity is typically adjudicated at the motion to
dismiss stage. 37 In an empirical study in 2012, Professor David
Ardia at the University of North Carolina determined that the
average CDA 230 case terminated on a motion to dismiss takes
nearly a year to reach dismissal. 38 Cases in which courts
permitted discovery before dismissal tended to last nearly twice
as long. 39 Ardia noted, plausibly, that litigating for either length
of time entails substantial defense-side costs. 40 Hiring a highquality defense-side firm to secure dismissal in a CDA 230 case
requires significant expense: a single partner at such a firm may
charge as much as $1,500 per hour for her services. 41 While this
Article does not attempt a precise calculation of such fees spread
over the average multi-hundred day period that Ardia calculated,
common sense dictates that these costs are significant.
Anti-SLAPP laws are better designed than CDA 230 to
address the reality of pre-trial costs. While CDA 230 provides
immunity on the merits, anti-SLAPP laws specifically address
those meritless lawsuits that accomplish their abusive purpose
regardless of success or failure on the merits. The purpose of a
SLAPP action is to force a defendant to spend money defending
herself rather than to obtain a favorable legal ruling.
Accordingly, unlike CDA 230, anti-SLAPP laws often
37

See Ardia, supra note 18, at 482–83.
Id. at 382.
39
Id. at 484.
40
Id.
41
Sara Randazzo & Jacqueline Palank, Legal Fees Cross New Mark: $1,500 an Hour,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2016, 10:11 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-feesreach-new-pinnacle-1-500-an-hour-1454960708.
38
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incorporate a fee-shifting provision, a time limit for scheduling a
pre-trial hearing, and a stay of discovery pending the resolution
of an anti-SLAPP motion. 42 Thus, state anti-SLAPP protection
is a crucial supplement to Section 230 in the context of abusive
litigation targeting online speech.
III. OVERVIEW OF STATE ANTI-SLAPP LAWS
A. History of SLAPPs
In 1966, a local branch of the NAACP instituted an
economic boycott against white merchants in Claiborne County,
Mississippi, to pressure elected officials to adopt several racial
justice measures. 43 In response, the merchants sued the NAACP
in 1969 for tortious interference with business in what became
the landmark civil rights case NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 44
The trial court found for the merchants and ordered the NAACP
to pay $3.5 million in damages, a verdict the Mississippi
Supreme Court upheld. 45 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned the verdict, holding that “the boycott clearly involved
constitutionally protected activity” through which the NAACP
“sought to bring about political, social, and economic change.”46
Though not referred to as one at the time, NAACP v.
Clairborne Hardware, Co. is a classic example of a ‘Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation,’ or SLAPP. SLAPPs are
meritless lawsuits that some individuals and businesses use as
weapons against those who speak out on public issues or petition
the government. SLAPP filers do not file a lawsuit to seek justice,
but rather, to silence, intimidate, and harass those who disagree
with them. SLAPPs are effective because even a meritless lawsuit
can take significant time and money to defend. To end or prevent
a SLAPP, those who speak out on issues of public interest
frequently agree to muzzle themselves, apologize, or “correct”
statements. 47
42

See infra Part III(c).
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889 (1982).
44
Id. at 889–91.
45
Id. at 893–94.
46
Id. at 911.
47
See, e.g., Troll Tracker Defamation Case Settles Before Going to Jury, PRIOR ART (Sept.
22, 2009), https://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2009/09/troll-trackerdefamation-case-settles-before-going-to-jury.html (discussing a lawsuit by a patent
litigant against the operator of the blog Troll Tracker, which resolved with an
apology); Kristine Phillips, British Newspaper Apologies, Agrees To Pay Damages for
‘False Statements’ About Melania Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2019/01/26/britishnewspaper-apologizes-agrees-pay-damages-false-statements-about-melaniatrump/?utm_term=.6841f535d7e8 (discussing First Lady Melania Trump’s
defamation lawsuit against the Daily Mail, which provoked a retraction before the
trial began).
43
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Professors George Pring and Penelope Canan first
pioneered the term in a pair of articles they co-wrote in 1988. 48
In their 1996 book, “SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out,”
the authors explain, “thousands of SLAPPs have been filed in
the last two decades, tens of thousands of Americans have been
SLAPPed, and still more have been muted or silenced by the
threat.” 49 SLAPP suits, the authors contented, “have struck
thousands of typical, middle-of-the-road Americans in just the
last few years. They are found in every state; they erupt at every
government level, in every type of political action, and on every
issue of public consequence. . . . [T]heir victims are now
legion.” 50
B. Cyber SLAPPS
As the Internet has enabled everyone to don the hat of
journalist, editor, town crier, or anonymous pamphleteer, social
media and consumer review sites have become cultural fixtures.
This rise in popularity brought along with it the phenomenon of
Cyber SLAPPs, which may be brought against both Internet
users and online intermediaries.
In 2003, as part of the government-sanctioned California
Coastal Records Project, photographer Kenneth Adelman took
more than 12,000 photos of California’s coastline to document
coastal erosion. 51 The photos were made publicly available
online. Unhappy that her beachfront mansion was seen in one of
the photos, actress Barbra Streisand filed a $50 million privacy
lawsuit against Adelman. 52 California Superior Court Judge
Allan Goodman ruled that the photo of Streisand’s estate did not
invade her privacy, and that the photo was protected speech
concerning a matter of public interest and thus a SLAPP. 53
Justin Kurtz was a college student when he was the target
of a Cyber SLAPP. 54 Kurtz started a Facebook page criticizing
the business practices of a towing company in Kalamazoo,
Michigan. The towing company responded by filing a $750,000
defamation lawsuit against Kurtz. 55 Kurtz’s Facebook page grew
48

See PRING & CANAN, supra note 10.
See id. at xi.
50
Id. at 3.
51
Kenneth Weiss, Streisand Sues Over Photograph of Her Coast Home on Web Site, L.A.
TIMES (May 30, 2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-may-30me-barbra30-story.html.
52
Id.
53
See id.; see also Court Throws Out Streisand’s Invasion of Privacy Lawsuit, REPS. COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Dec. 4, 2003), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-medialaw-resources/news/court-throws-out-streisands-invasion-privacy-lawsuit.
54
T&J Towing v. Kurtz, DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT (June 7, 2010, 10:30 AM),
http://www.dmlp.org/threats/tj-towing-v-kurtz.
55
Rex Hall, Jr., T&J Towing Sues Western Michigan University Student Who Created
Facebook Page About It, MLIVE (Apr. 13, 2010),
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to over 14,000 supporters and his case was the subject of a frontpage article in the New York Times. Kurtz’s suit dragged on for
more than eight months before dismissal. 56 Michigan did not
have an anti-SLAPP law under which Kurtz could have been
rewarded attorney’s fees.
Plaintiffs angered by online posts often choose to target
the operator of the website that hosted the allegedly offending
third-party content, either instead of or in addition to the author
herself. For example, in Albert v. Yelp, a consumer lawyer sued
Yelp for defamation over negative reviews of her firm. 57 Lenore
Albert, the proprietor of a small plaintiff-side firm in Huntington
Beach, California, advertised herself as a “consumer advocate”
fighting on behalf of “the [p]eople.” 58 An employee of the firm
became upset with Albert after she missed a filing deadline in a
case brought on behalf of the employee’s friend. This employee
organized a campaign among her friends to lower the firm’s Yelp
rating by posting reviews characterizing Albert as an
incompetent attorney who misses deadlines. Albert brought a
defamation suit against the employee, her friends, and, most
importantly for the purpose of obtaining a measurable award of
damages, against Yelp itself. 59 Luckily for Yelp, California law
provides robust anti-SLAPP protections. Yelp’s anti-SLAPP
motion was granted, and the suit was dismissed with costs. 60
In Nunes v. Twitter et al., pending at the time of this
article’s publication, a Republican Congressman sued Twitter
and political consultant Elizabeth Mair for negligence,
defamation, “insulting words,” and common law conspiracy, in
connection with statements posted on three satirical accounts. 61
The three user accounts, titled “Devin Nunes’ Cow,” “Devin
Nunes’ Mom,” and “Devin Nunes’ Alt-Mom,” posted a variety
of mocking comments from the perspective of the fictionalized
characters they respectively represented. “Devin Nunes’ Mom,”
for instance, in reference to Nunes’ political stance on the Special
Counsel’s investigation of the Trump Campaign for collusion
https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2010/04/t_j_towing_sues_we
stern_michig.html.
56
Rex Hall, Jr., Western Michigan University Student Sued in Battle with Towing
Company: Facebook Group Airing Complaints About T & J Towing Takes Off, MLIVE
(Apr. 14, 2010),
https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2010/04/western_michigan_u
niversity_st_8.html; Dan Frosch, Venting Online, Consumers Can Find Themselves in
Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/us/01slapp.html.
57
Albert v. Yelp, Inc., No. G051607, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 5262 (July 15, 2016).
58
Id. at *9.
59
Id. at *2–5.
60
Id. at *23.
61
See Complaint, Nunes v. Twitter, Inc. (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.scribd.com/document/402297422/Nunes-Complaint-3-18-19.
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with the Russian government, tweeted “Are you trying to
obstruct a federal investigation again? You come home right this
instant or no more Minecraft!” 62
This is a paradigmatic SLAPP, as it targets protected
speech, and all of the claims alleged in the complaint would
likely be found meritless. The plaintiff alleges that Twitter’s
failure to remove purportedly defamatory content amounts to
negligence; 63 but courts have consistently held that CDA 230
preempts common law negligence claims advanced on
analogous theories. 64 Nunes’ defamation claims would probably
be frustrated by the heightened standard of intentionality for
defamation claims by public officials, 65 as well as by protections
for satirical speech concerning public officials. 66 The plaintiff’s
conspiracy claim is fatally premised on his likely defective
defamation claim. 67 The plaintiff also alleged “insulting
words,”68 a state statutory cause of action that mirrors the
Constitutional “fighting words” doctrine. 69 This limitation on
the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech only
applies when words tend to provoke an immediate physical
altercation or “breach of the peace,” which is unlikely in this
case, at the very least, due to the physical space between Nunes
and the defendant speakers. 70 The defendant’s speech might
qualify for protection under Virginia’s anti-SLAPP law, which
recognizes speech targeted by defamation allegations as
protected activity under some circumstances. 71

62

Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶¶ 33–48.
64
See, e.g. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008). See also text accompanying note
24.
65
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (establishing that
defamation claims by public officials require a demonstration of “actual malice”).
66
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988) (denying a
defamation claim based on a satirical depiction of a public figure on account of a
lack of “actual malice”).
67
See Complaint, supra note 61, at ¶¶ 53–57.
68
See id. at ¶¶ 50–52.
69
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See also Eugene Volokh,
Rep. Devin Nunes Suing Tweeters for “Insulting Words,” Claiming the Insults Caused $250M
of Damage to Him, REASON (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:57 AM),
https://reason.com/2019/03/20/rep-devin-nunes-suing-tweeters-for-insul.
70
See Volokh, supra note 69; see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (defining “fighting
words” as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace”).
71
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2(A) (West 2018) (“A person shall be immune from
civil liability for . . . a claim of defamation based solely on statements . . . regarding
matters of public concern that would be protected under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution made by that person that are communicated to a third
party. . . .”).
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C. The Mechanics of Anti-SLAPP Protection
To invoke the protection of an anti-SLAPP law, a
defendant typically must go through two steps. First, she must
show that a suit is in response to First-Amendment-related
protected activity on the part of the defendant. Every antiSLAPP law is worded differently, but some of the broader ones,
like those enacted in California, Texas, and Washington, D.C.,
specify that they protect statements on “matters of public
interest,” “issues of public concern,” or something similar. 72
Second, a defendant must make a prima facie showing in a pretrial proceeding that the suit is meritless. In California’s
terminology, a plaintiff must show the “probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” 73 Many statutes indicate a
specific time period within which this hearing must be held, 74
with the apparent purpose of minimizing the burden of a SLAPP
on the defendant. Some statutes also include a stay of discovery,
to relieve a defendant of the burden and expense of document
productions and depositions until after a plaintiff has shown that
her case has merit. 75 Unlike CDA 230, anti-SLAPP laws in many
states impose the defendant’s costs on the plaintiff upon
dismissal; more precisely, twenty-five states provide this
feature. 76
D. Current State anti-SLAPP Laws
Thirty-four states provide some form of anti-SLAPP
protection, with thirty-two states providing such protection by
statute, as opposed to case law. 77 State anti-SLAPP protections
vary in strength and breadth. They vary, among other ways, both
in what sorts of speech or conduct they regard as protected
activity, and in whether they provide for attorney’s fees upon
dismissal.
Broader anti-SLAPP statutes can be found in Oregon, 78
California, 79 Texas, 80 and D.C., 81 which all provide
comprehensive coverage for both speech and petitioning activity.
California protects, among other categories of activity, “any
written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
72

See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 12.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2018).
74
See, e.g., id. § 425.16(f) (2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.004(a)
(West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1041(b), (d) (2018).
75
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 27.003(c) (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 16-5502(c)(1) (2018).
76
State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 12.
77
Id.
78
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150–55 (2018).
79
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2018).
80
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001–27.011 (2018).
81
D.C. CODE §§ 16–5502–5505 (2019).
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public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest.” 82 This capacious definition encompasses a seemingly
endless list of activities, from statements about the character of a
government official, 83 to statements made in a hospital’s peer
review proceedings established by state law, 84 to statements
criticizing the manager of a homeowner’s association. 85
Importantly, a public website is regarded as a “public
forum” for purposes of California’s anti-SLAPP statute. 86 Thus,
any statement on an “issue of public interest” made by a user of
a website of the user-generated content model is protected
activity. By contrast, New York’s anti-SLAPP statute, which
protects only petitioning activity, 87 is unlikely to apply to online
speech.
California’s anti-SLAPP law, in contrast to some other
state statutes, also protects petitioning activity involving a wide
variety of types of government bodies. Protected activity
encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law.” 88 Pennsylvania’s
anti-SLAPP law, by contrast, protects only statements made
about environmental issues to a government agency with
jurisdiction over such issues. 89
Cases involving New Mexico’s and New York’s narrow
anti-SLAPP laws provide illustrations of the operation of weak
anti-SLAPP protections. New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP law only
protects statements made in “quasi-judicial proceedings,” 90 as
opposed to statements made in any “official proceeding,” as
several stronger state anti-SLAPP laws protect. 91 In 2012, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals allowed a $4 million lawsuit to
resume after it had previously been ruled a SLAPP by a federal
district court judge. 92 The district court judge ruled that a lawsuit
by a development company against local landowners violated
the state’s anti-SLAPP law because it was based on a previous
lawsuit that the landowners had filed against the developer. The
appellate court reversed this decision, stating that only speech in
connection with “quasi-judicial” proceedings qualifies for anti82

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3) (West 2018).
Vogel v. Felice, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1015 (2005).
84
See Kibbler v. N. Inyo Cty. Local Hosp. Dist., 138 P.3d 193 (2006).
85
See Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468 (2000).
86
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 n.4 (2006).
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N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 76-a(1) (Consol. 2019).
88
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3) (West 2018).
89
27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301–03 (2018).
90
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (2018).
91
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(1) (West 2018).
92
Angel Fire Pub. Improvement Dist. v. Glaser, No. 30,368, at *2 (N.M. Ct. App.
Nov. 21, 2012), https://casetext.com/case/angel-fire-pub-improvement-dist-v-glaser.
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SLAPP protection, and that the landowners’ lawsuit was “a
purely judicial proceeding, not a quasi-judicial proceeding.” 93 By
contrast, California’s anti-SLAPP statute is not restricted to
statements made before a particular type of government body,
but rather includes protections for “any written or oral statement
or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law.” 94
New York’s anti-SLAPP law only offers protection
against SLAPPs brought by individuals or entities seeking
permits or applications from a government body. 95 To prevail on
an anti-SLAPP motion in New York, a SLAPP target must
demonstrate two things. First, she must show that the plaintiff
suing her is a “public applicant or permittee.” Second, she must
show that the plaintiff’s claim against her is an “action involving
public petition and participation.” 96
But even if a defendant can establish that she meets these
requirements, the court does not have to award damages. All
anti-SLAPP damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, are
awarded at the court’s discretion under New York law. 97 This is
sharp contrast to a strong anti-SLAPP law like California’s,
which includes a mandatory attorney’s fee provision: “a
prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be
entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” 98
In 2003, the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy
Coalition (“NWBCCC”) was advocating on behalf of tenants in
several buildings in Bronx, New York, picketing and posting
flyers that highlighted the egregiously substandard conditions in
which the tenants were living. 99 Rather than fix the conditions or
otherwise address the criticisms, a realty company that owned
five of the buildings filed suit against the NWBCCC, claiming
trespass, libel and wrongful interference with business
relationships. The trial court initially granted a temporary
restraining order to prevent the organizers from “trespassing”
onto the realty company’s property. Although the court
eventually held that the realty firms had failed to submit any
evidence in support of its claims, it nonetheless allowed litigation
to proceed for years. Meanwhile, the SLAPP was exceedingly
93

Id. at *7.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(1) (West 2018).
95
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 76-a(1) (LexisNexis 2019).
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Id. § (a)(1)(a); see also Edwards v. Martin, 158 A.D.3d 1044 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
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N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §70A-(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2019) (“[C]osts and attorney’s fees
may be recovered . . . .”) (emphasis added).
98
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2018).
99
See New Line Realty V Corp. v. United Comms. of Univ. Heights, No. 1021/2004,
2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2872, 236 (Sup. Ct. June 19, 2006).
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effective at halting the NWBCCC’s advocacy. As one staffer
recounted, “we basically stopped working in most of the
buildings we were involved in because we were afraid they would
be added on [to the lawsuit].” 100 Further, the NWBCCC racked
up more than one million dollars in attorney’s fees and costs. 101
IV. DEPLOYING CDA 230 IMMUNITY THROUGH AN
ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
Anti-SLAPP laws can supplement the protection
provided by CDA 230 by combining the latter’s substantive
immunity with procedural mechanisms that reduce pre-trial
costs. The combined application of CDA 230 and anti-SLAPP
protection has occurred several times in California state courts.
More precisely, California law permits defendants to assert a
CDA 230 defense to demonstrate that a suit is meritless for
purposes of anti-SLAPP protection. In Albert v. Yelp, for instance,
discussed above, 102 a plaintiff-side consumer lawyer who
advertised herself as a “consumer advocate” fighting on behalf
of “the people” sued a Yelp commenter who accused her of
missing clients’ filing deadlines, as well as Yelp itself. Yelp
disposed of the suit with an anti-SLAPP motion. In the first step
of its anti-SLAPP analysis, the court determined that whether a
lawyer who presents herself as a crusader for “the people” merits
this self-description is a matter of public concern within the
purview of anti-SLAPP protection. 103 Second, the court
determined that the suit was meritless, as CDA 230 clearly
protects Yelp from liability for defamation committed by a thirdparty consumer reviewer. 104
Importantly, in California, any publicly accessible
website is considered a public forum. 105 Hence, provided that
online speech concerns a statement on an “issue of public
interest,” it logically must qualify as protected activity.
Consequently, the “public forum” requirement is not a bar to
anti-SLAPP protection in any CDA 230 cases. In Cross v.
Facebook, plaintiff rap artist “Mikel Knight” sued Facebook for
failing to remove a page titled “Families Against Mikel Knight,”
which plaintiff claimed incited violence and death threats against
him and interfered with his business deals. 106 Criticism of Knight
100

See Betsy Morais, Anti-SLAPP Ruling Cheers Tenant Advocates, CITY LIMITS (Aug.
18, 2008), https://citylimits.org/2008/08/18/anti-slapp-ruling-cheers-tenantadvocates/.
101
Id.
102
Albert v. Yelp, Inc., No. G051607, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 5262 (July 15, 2016).
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Albert, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 5262, at *8–9.
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See id. at *12–19.
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Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 n.4 (2006).
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on this page focused on two incidents in which independent
contractor drivers of vans featuring Knight’s name and logo fell
asleep at the wheel, resulting cumulatively in several injuries and
deaths. Facebook filed an anti-SLAPP motion. 107 On the first
prong of its analysis, the California Court of Appeal noted that
the “Families Against Mikel Knight” was accessible by anyone
who agreed to Facebook’s terms of service. Thus, as a “web site
accessible to the public,” the page was a public forum.108
Additionally, the statements in question concerned an “issue of
public interest”: the “danger of trucks on highways driven by
sleep-deprived drivers.” 109
V. GAPS IN STATE ANTI-SLAPP COVERAGE
The need for a federal anti-SLAPP law arises from
loopholes in the existing anti-SLAPP regime. Within the current
patchwork of state anti-SLAPP protections, the range of CDA
230 cases in which anti-SLAPP protection is available is limited
by a number of factors. First, because states offer varying levels
of anti-SLAPP protection, plaintiffs can engage in forumshopping among state courts. Second, in cases in which a
plaintiff in a state with a weak anti-SLAPP law files a defamation
action against a defendant in a state with a strong anti-SLAPP
law, choice-of-law principles will tend to favor the weaker law of
the plaintiff’s home state. Third, because state anti-SLAPP rules
generally do not apply to federal claims, plaintiffs can utilize
federal analogues to state law claims. Fourth, plaintiffs can
exploit a federal circuit split over the question of whether to
apply state anti-SLAPP rules in federal diversity cases.
A. Forum-Shopping Among State Courts
A plaintiff can avoid state anti-SLAPP protection by
strategically filing a suit in a jurisdiction with a weak anti-SLAPP
law. For example, Washington Redskins owner Daniel
Snyder responded to an article in a Washington D.C. newspaper
criticizing Snyder’s management and ownership practices by
threatening to sue a New York hedge fund that owned the
paper. 110 Washington, D.C. had at the time and continues to
have a stronger anti-SLAPP law than New York. In a letter to
the hedge fund, Snyder’s attorney candidly admitted the abusive
motivation of the suit, writing “[w]e presume that defending
such litigation would not be a rational strategy for an investment
107

Id. at 196.
Id. at 199.
109
Id. at 200.
110
David Carr, Ridiculed, an N.F.L. Owner Goes to Court, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2011),
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fund such as yours. Indeed, the cost of the litigation would
presumably quickly outstrip the asset value of the Washington
City Paper.” 111 Snyder ultimately dropped the suit. 112
B. Choice-of-law Principles in Cross-Jurisdictional Defamation Actions
In cross-jurisdictional defamation actions, a plaintiff in a
state with a weak anti-SLAPP law is likely to benefit from her
home state’s anti-SLAPP rules and avoid the stronger antiSLAPP rules of the defendant’s home state. In Ayyadurai v. Floor
64, Inc., 113 a scientist and entrepreneur who ran a company in
Massachusetts called CytoSolve, sued the operator of
Techdirt.com and one of its writers, in connection with a series
of articles they had written casting doubt on the plaintiff’s
assertion that he had invented e-mail. 114 Ayyadurai filed suit in
the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 115 One of the defendants, a
writer for the site who had posted an article containing
hyperlinks to user comments discussing Ayyadurai’s assertions
interspersed with the defendant’s own editorial comments,
claimed CDA 230 immunity.116 This defendant, who resided in
California, sought to apply California’s strong anti-SLAPP
statute, while the plaintiff sought to apply Massachusetts’ weak
anti-SLAPP statute. 117
This defendant succeeded on his CDA 230 defense,
because he had essentially republished content provided by
others, 118 but was denied his preferred anti-SLAPP law on the
basis of choice-of-law principles that apply in interstate
defamation cases. 119 The court cited the Restatement (Second) of
the Conflict of Laws § 150 for the proposition that “there is
effectively a presumption that the law of the state of the plaintiff’s
domicile will apply unless some other state ‘has a greater interest
in the determination of the particular issue.’” 120 The court found
no such overriding interest in the application of California law.
Citing factors from Restatement § 6, the court held that “ensuring
111

Id.
Mike Madden, Dan Snyder Drops Lawsuit Against Washington City Paper, Dave
McKenna, WASH. CITY PAPER (Sept. 10, 2011),
https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/city-desk/blog/13064052/dansnyder-drops-lawsuit-against-washington-city-paper-dave-mckenna.
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270 F. Supp. 3d 343, 349 (D. Mass. 2017). This case is currently pending before
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Public Participation
Projects intends to file an amicus brief related to the anti-SLAPP ruling in this case.
114
Id. at 351.
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See id. at 349.
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Id. at 355.
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Id. at 352.
118
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Id. at 353.
120
Id.
112

386

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the ‘certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result’ and ‘ease
in the determination and application of the applicable law’ favors
adhering to the presumption set forth in [Restatement § 150].” 121
This is not an unlikely situation in cases involving the
operators of websites. Many technology companies are based in
states with strong anti-SLAPP laws, like California and Texas,
while websites themselves are published in every state.
Defamation suits thus are likely to involve plaintiffs in states with
weak anti-SLAPP statutes allegedly harmed by defamatory
statements on web pages whose operators are located in states
with strong-anti-SLAPP laws.
C. Artful Pleading of Federal Claims
State anti-SLAPP rules do not apply to federal claims, at
least in federal court; 122 thus, a plaintiff bringing a SLAPP can
bypass state anti-SLAPP protections by pleading a federal claim
rather than a similar state law claim. For example, in 2016, a
Canadian logging company brought a lawsuit against
Greenpeace in response to a media campaign accusing the
company of unsustainable logging practices. 123 Resolute Forest
Products alleged, among other claims, that Greenpeace violated
both state and federal anti-racketeering laws by “conspiring to
spread false reports.” 124 Resolute’s RICO claim was equivalent
to its state racketeering claim and overlapped with its state law
defamation cause of action, which entailed “knowingly and
intentionally publish[ing] false and injurious statements.” 125 The
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
all claims against Greenpeace but only applied the anti-SLAPP
law’s fee-shifting feature to the state law claims. 126 Thus,
121

Id. at 354.
See, e.g., Resolute Forest Prods., Inc. v. Greenpeace Int’l, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1005,
1024 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“While California’s anti-SLAPP statute clearly applies to
state claims brought in federal courts, and even to federal claims brought in state
court, it does not clearly apply to federal claims brought in federal court.”) (citations
omitted); Consumer Cellular, Inc. v. ConsumerAffairs.com, No. 3:15-CV-1908-PK,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72573, at *19 (D. Or. Feb. 29, 2016) (“[S]tate anti-SLAPP
statutes are as a matter of law necessarily inapplicable to federal causes of action.”);
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] federal court
can only entertain anti-SLAPP special motions to strike in connection with state law
claims.”), declined to extend by Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness v. Cable News
Agency, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Ginx, Inc. v. Soho All., 720 F.
Supp. 2d 342, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In every other case this Court has located,
federal courts have declined to apply Anti-SLAPP statutes to federal claims.”); S.
Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, No. 07-12018-DPW,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85764, at *26 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2008) (“There is no support
for applying the anti-SLAPP statute to federal claims.”).
123
Resolute Forest Prods., Inc. v. Greenpeace Int’l, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1011
(N.D. Cal. 2017).
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Id. at 1013.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 1024–25.
122

2019]

FEDERAL ANTI-SLAPP LAW

387

Resolute partly accomplished its intended objective of forcing
Greenpeace to spend money defending itself in court.
The same tactic—evading state anti-SLAPP protection by
pleading a federal RICO claim parallel to a state law defamation
claim—has been deployed successfully in at least one CDA 230
case. In Consumer Cellular, Inc. v. Consumeraffairs.com, a cell phone
service provider filed a lawsuit in federal court in Oregon against
a consumer review website for defamation and RICO violations,
among other claims, in connection with the defendant’s alleged
manipulation of customer reviews of the plaintiff’s services. 127
The court found that Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law did not apply to
the RICO claim. 128 As a separate matter, the defendant failed to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its claims, due to the
weakness of its CDA 230 defense. 129
D. Circuit Split on the Applicability of State Anti-SLAPP Rules in
Diversity Actions
Currently, Circuit Courts are split as to whether state antiSLAPP laws should apply in diversity cases in federal court. In
the landmark case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme
Court held that a federal court in a diversity case must apply the
substantive statutory and common law of the state where the
court sits. 130 By contrast, in federal court, federal procedural rules
must be applied in place of state procedural rules. 131 The First, 132
Second, 133 Fifth, 134 and Ninth 135 Circuits have held, that state
anti-SLAPP laws apply in federal diversity actions, under a
variety of justifications. The Tenth Circuit 136 and the D.C.
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Consumer Cellular, Inc. v. ConsumerAffairs.com, No. 3:15-CV-1908-PK, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72573, at *2–3 (D. Or. Feb. 29, 2016).
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See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 87–92 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56 are not sufficiently broad to control the
issues under Maine’s anti-SLAPP law before the court, and that Maine’s anti-SLAPP
law “substantively alters Maine-law claims that are based on a defendant's protected
petitioning activity”)
133
See Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding the application of
the immunity and fee-shifting provisions of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal
court to be “unproblematic,” and holding that the same provisions are “substantive”
and do not “squarely conflict with a valid federal rule”).
134
See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 168–69 (5th Cir.
2009) (holding, without explanation, that “Louisiana law, including the nominallyprocedural [Louisiana anti-SLAPP law], governs this diversity case”).
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See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d
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(10th Cir. 2018).
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Circuit, 137 however, have both held that state anti-SLAPP
motions are not allowed in federal court because they conflict
with the federal rules of civil procedure.
Consequently, plaintiffs in some regions of the country
may circumvent state anti-SLAPP laws by establishing federal
diversity jurisdiction. One commentator has drawn attention to
two instances of such forum-shopping. 138 Following 3M v.
Boulter, in which a D.C. federal district court held that state antiSLAPP rules are procedural and thus do not apply in federal
court, 139 an anti-LGBT preacher alleging several speech torts in
a suit against a blogger and an MSNBC commentator who had
publicly criticized him, 140 voluntarily dismissed his suit in the
D.C. Superior Court with the stated intention of re-filing in
federal court to take advantage of the rule established in
Boulter. 141 More recently, three businessmen who alleged that
they were defamed by certain statements contained in the “Steele
Dossier,” which compiled research on presidential candidate
Donald Trump’s possible ties to the Russian government, filed
identical defamation actions in D.C. Superior court and D.C.
federal district court. 142 The Superior Court dismissed the
defamation claim under D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute. 143 The
federal case is still pending; 144 but given unambiguous precedent
on the question, the federal court is likely to find that D.C.’s antiSLAPP statute is in conflict with federal procedure and thus
cannot apply in federal court.
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Leslie P. Machado, Why Decisions in D.C. Illustrate the Need for a Federal Anti-SLAPP
Law (Part 1), PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT (Jul. 23, 2018), https://antislapp.org/slapp-blog/2018/7/23/why-decisions-in-dc-illustrate-the-need-for-afederal-anti-slapp-law-part-1.
139
3M Co. v. Boulter, 290 F.R.D. 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013).
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VI. THE IMPACT OF A FEDERAL ANTI-SLAPP LAW
A federal anti-SLAPP law would mitigate the problem of
pre-trial costs in CDA 230 cases and close many of the gaps in
anti-SLAPP coverage discussed in Part V. A federal anti-SLAPP
law would provide four related features addressed to pre-trial
costs: a fee-shifting mechanism, a time limit for a pre-trial
hearing, immediate interlocutory appeal, and a stay of discovery.
A federal anti-SLAPP law would close most of the gaps
in existing anti-SLAPP coverage. A federal anti-SLAPP law
would apply to federal claims. A removal provision would
preclude plaintiffs from strategically filing suit in a state court in
a state with a weak anti-SLAPP law or no anti-SLAPP law.
But a federal anti-SLAPP law would only partially
preclude strategic filing of diversity actions. In federal circuits
that treat state anti-SLAPP laws as substantive for purposes of
Erie analysis, a less severe form of forum-shopping might persist,
in which plaintiffs either seek to establish diversity to benefit
from a federal law weaker than their home state’s, to avoid
establishing diversity to benefit from a weaker state law. With
respect to the obstacle of choice-of-law principles that favor the
weaker anti-SLAPP law of a plaintiff’s home state in federal
diversity actions, a federal anti-SLAPP law would only preclude
forum shopping in circuits in which state anti-SLAPP rules are
treated as procedural.
Model language for a federal anti-SLAPP law has been
borrowed from the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, 145 the most
recently proposed federal anti-SLAPP bill. Important provisions
that are not relevant to the focus of this Article have been noted
briefly as well.
A. Features of a Federal Anti-SLAPP Law
A federal anti-SLAPP law should have at least the six
following features relevant to CDA 230 immunity in the context
of First Amendment-related conduct: (i) a broad definition of
protected activity; (ii) a fee-shifting provision; (iii) a time limit for
dismissal; (iv) an immediate interlocutory appeal; (v) a stay on
discovery; (vi) a removal provision; and (vii) a commercial
speech exemption.
First, the definition of protected activity should, as in the
California anti-SLAPP law, be worded to encompass speech on
a broad spectrum of subjects and in a broad variety of fora, and
to cover petitioning activity involving many types of government
bodies. The SPEAK FREE Act specifies that a special motion to
dismiss may be filed by a party facing a claim that “arises from
145

SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015).
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an oral or written statement or other expression by the defendant
that was made . . . about a matter of public concern.” 146 To
mitigate uncertainties in judicial interpretation, the law further
should specify more specific general categories of issues that
qualify as sufficiently “public.” The SPEAK FREE Act, for
instance, defines “matter of public concern” to include issues
related to “health or safety;” “environmental, economic, or
community well-being;” “the government;” “a public official or
public figure;” or “a good, product or service in the
marketplace.” 147 Importantly, although largely irrelevant in the
context of CDA 230, the SPEAK FREE Act, like some state antiSLAPP laws, 148 also protects petitioning activity in broad terms:
it protects any “expression by the defendant that was made in
connection with an official proceeding.” 149
Second, the law should contain a fee-shifting provision
providing for the award of costs to a party who prevails on an
anti-SLAPP motion. The SPEAK FREE Act provides that “a
court shall award a person that files and prevails on a motion to
dismiss . . . litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorney[’]s fees.” 150 To prevent SLAPP filers from evading this
consequence through voluntary dismissal prior to a pre-trial antiSLAPP hearing, the fee-shifting provision should impose the
same penalty on plaintiffs who voluntarily dismiss their claims
after an anti-SLAPP motion is filed. 151 In order to deter frivolous
anti-SLAPP motions, costs should in some circumstances be
awarded to the plaintiff. The SPEAK FREE Act thus provides
that “if a court finds that [an anti-SLAPP motion] is frivolous or
is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall
award litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorney’s fees to the party that responded to the motion or
notice.” 152
Third, both because wasted time is itself a cost to a
defendant and because the more time spent litigating
corresponds with greater costs, a federal anti-SLAPP law should
include a time limit for a pre-trial hearing. The SPEAK FREE
Act requires that a motion be filed within forty-five days of
service of the claim, 153 and requires a hearing within thirty days
of the filing of the motion or within 30 days of removal, if the
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case is removed to federal court under the statute’s removal
provision.154
Fourth, for the same reason that a defendant should be
able to schedule a prompt pre-trial hearing, a defendant should
be able to appeal a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion promptly.
The SPEAK FREE Act provides that an “aggrieved party may
take an immediate interlocutory appeal from an order granting
or denying in whole or in part a special motion to dismiss.”155
Fifth, because compliance with discovery requests can be
time-consuming, expensive, and intrusive, a federal anti-SLAPP
law should provide for a stay of discovery upon the filing of an
anti-SLAPP motion. The SPEAK FREE Act stipulates that
“upon the filing of a special motion to dismiss . . . discovery
proceedings in the action shall be stayed until a final and
unappealable order is entered on such motion unless good cause
is shown for specified discovery.” 156 The qualifier “unless good
cause is shown for specified discovery” allows courts the
discretion to permit limited discovery when merited by the
circumstances.
Sixth, a federal anti-SLAPP law should contain a removal
provision, to prevent forum-shopping of various kinds. The
SPEAK FREE Act stipulates that “a civil action in a State court
that raises a claim [arising from protected activity] may be
removed to the district court of the United States for the judicial
district and division embracing the place where the civil action is
pending.” 157
Seventh, to prevent the application of the anti-SLAPP
mechanism in commercial contexts in which the First
Amendment would provide more limited protection,158 a federal
law should contain a commercial speech exemption. The
following is the SPEAK FREE Act’s commercial speech
exemption:
[T]he court shall not grant a special
motion to dismiss . . . if the claim is
brought against a person primarily
engaged in the business of selling or
leasing goods or services where
such claim arises from the
statement or conduct of such person
and such statement or conduct . . .
consists of representations of fact
154
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156
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about such person’s or a business
competitor’s goods or services . . .
[and] arises out of the sale or lease
of goods, services, or an insurance
product, insurance services, or a
commercial transaction in which
the intended audience is an actual
or potential buyer or customer. 159
Importantly, as is apparent in the wording of the provision, this
exemption prevents the use of the anti-SLAPP defense in false
advertising cases.
The above provisions and exemptions are specifically
relevant to strengthening CDA 230 immunity in the context of
First Amendment-related conduct. There are other important
provisions and exemptions, however, that should be included a
federal anti-SLAPP law. 160 These include but are not limited to
a special motion to quash 161 and a public interest exemption. 162
B. A Federal Anti-SLAPP law Would Mitigate the Problem of
Pre-Trial Costs in CDA 230 Litigation
The combination of a fee-shifting provision, a time
limitation for scheduling a pre-trial hearing, and a stay of
discovery adequately addresses the problem of pre-trial costs in
a CDA 230 context. A fee-shifting provision would both
compensate defendants for money wasted defending against
SLAPPs and potentially have a deterrent effect as well. A time
limitation for scheduling a pre-trial hearing, and the availability
of immediate appeal of a negative ruling at that hearing,
commonly address both the reality that costs correlate with time
spent in litigation, and the expense of wasted time itself. A stay
of discovery mitigates the cost in time and money involved in
responding to document requests and submitting to depositions,
and the inherent cost of submitting to intrusions into one’s
private or business affairs. A stay of discovery also is particularly
important in light of Ardia’s finding that CDA 230 cases in
which immunity is adjudicated after discovery tend to last longer
than average. 163

159

H.R. 2304 § 4202(b)(2).
For a comprehensive list of important components of federal anti-SLAPP
legislation, see generally Samantha Brown & Mark Goldowitz, The Public
Participation Act: A Comprehensive Model Approach to End Strategic Lawsuits Against
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C. Federal Anti-SLAPP Rules Would Apply to Federal Claims
A federal anti-SLAPP defense would apply to federal
claims. Many courts have held that a state anti-SLAPP defense
does not apply to federal claims. 164 A federal anti-SLAPP defense
would eliminate this gap in anti-SLAPP coverage, including in
cases in which state anti-SLAPP rules apply to parallel state
claims.
D. Federal Anti-SLAPP Rules Would Apply in Federal Diversity
Actions in Some Federal Circuits
A federal anti-SLAPP law would prevent plaintiffs from
evading state anti-SLAPP laws by filing diversity actions, only in
federal circuits in which state anti-SLAPP rules are regarded as
procedural. 165 A federal court that regards state anti-SLAPP rules
as state procedural rules in conflict with federal procedure, will
have no objection to applying federal procedural anti-SLAPP
rules to state law claims. And in these circuits, a defendant likely
will not be disadvantaged by filing an anti-SLAPP motion under
federal rather than state law, because a federal law is modelled
after expansive anti-SLAPP laws like California’s.
But a federal court that regards state anti-SLAPP rules as
part of the substantive law of the state, and thus currently
precludes forum-shopping by applying state anti-SLAPP rules in
federal court, will continue to apply those state rules even after a
federal anti-SLAPP law is passed. Thus, in these circuits,
assuming the current circuit split persists after the passage of
federal anti-SLAPP legislation, plaintiffs in diversity actions may
benefit from state anti-SLAPP laws that are less expansive than
the federal anti-SLAPP law. In short, until this circuit split is
resolved, the current forum-shopping problem—that of plaintiffs
filing diversity actions to evade anti-SLAPP protection all
together—would be replaced by a less severe form of forumshopping, in which plaintiffs can choose a weaker state antiSLAPP law over a stronger federal anti-SLAPP law.
E. With the Passage of a Federal Law, Choice of Law Principles
Favoring Weaker State Anti-SLAPP laws Would be Undermined
in Some Federal Circuits
A federal anti-SLAPP law would partly eliminate the
obstacle presented in Ayyadurai, discussed above, 166 of
choice-of-law principles that favor the weaker anti-SLAPP law
of a plaintiff’s state. If a federal court in a diversity action regards
state anti-SLAPP rules as procedural, it will be inclined to apply
164
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the federal version of that procedural rule, and thus to avoid
altogether the question of which state anti-SLAPP law to apply
in a cross-jurisdictional tort action. But if the court regards state
anti-SLAPP rules as substantive, state anti-SLAPP rules will still
apply in federal court, and the question will remain of which
state’s anti-SLAPP law to apply.
F. A Removal Provision Would Preclude Forum-Shopping Among
State Courts
If a federal law contains a removal provision, defendants
will be able to evade weak state anti-SLAPP laws by removing a
state suit to federal court. This will prevent plaintiffs from
strategically electing to sue in state court in a state with a weak
anti-SLAPP law.
VII. LIMITATIONS TO A COMBINED CDA 230-ANTI-SLAPP
DEFENSE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Although a federal anti-SLAPP law would undoubtedly
enhance CDA 230 by closing many of the loopholes discussed in
Part V, this fortified CDA 230-anti-SLAPP defense would have
certain limitations in its coverage. Some of these limitations are
inherent in CDA 230 immunity, and others are due to an
imperfect overlap between CDA 230 immunity and anti-SLAPP
protection. First, CDA 230 immunity can be narrowed by
statutory amendment or judicial interpretation, and any such
development simultaneously reduces the scope of anti-SLAPP
protection in a CDA 230 context. Second, state anti-SLAPP
jurisprudence suggests that a federal anti-SLAPP law would not
apply in all CDA 230 cases—in particular, not all speech by
internet users touches on “issues of public interest.” Finally, a
federal anti-SLAPP law likely would have certain exemptions—
for instance, for commercial speech—that would preclude the
use of a federal anti-SLAPP defense in some cases in which CDA
230 would apply. The latter in the combined CDA 230-antiSLAPP defense reflects the fact that CDA 230 is designed to
facilitate the growth of internet commerce as a general matter,
and thus immunizes intermediaries from liability in some
circumstances in which freedom of speech concerns are not
implicated.
A. Judicial and Statutory Limitations to CDA 230 Immunity
A federal anti-SLAPP law would neither add to nor
subtract from substantive CDA 230 immunity; the contours of
this immunity, however, are defined by Congress and the courts.
Succeeding on an anti-SLAPP motion requires a prima facie
showing that a suit is meritless, and a complaint that pleads
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around the bounds of CDA § 230 immunity potentially has
merit. Such limitations come from both case law and statutory
law.
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com established that website operators can be held
liable for “materially contributing” to unlawful third-party
content. 167 Roommates.com, an online roommate matching
service, by programming design required users to specify their
gender preferences for roommates, displayed those preferences
in users’ profiles, and limited the results of searches for
roommates based on parameters established in this way. 168 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because
Roommates.com had “materially contributed” to the
unlawfulness of the content under the Fair Housing Act, it had
“developed” that content within the meaning of CDA §
230(c)(1). 169 The court distinguished types of editing that should
not cause a defendant to lose immunity, such as removing
obscenity or trimming for length, from editing that “contribute[]
to the alleged illegality,” such as removing the word “not” from
a third-party message reading “[Name] did not steal the
artwork.” 170 Roommates.com authored specifically what was
illegal about the content—its discriminatory nature—in
requiring third parties to state gender-based preferences for
roommates. 171
This case has had a widespread effect on CDA 230
jurisprudence. In the leading case Jones v. Dirty World
Entertainment, the Sixth Circuit applied the “material
contribution” standard to defamation law. 172 Importantly,
various lower courts have denied immunity under this
standard. 173 For instance, federal district courts have denied
immunity where a website operator posted content herself, 174
conspired with a third-party commenter to defame a plaintiff, 175
incorporated quotes from third parties in her own editorial
writing, 176 and made defamatory factual representations about
167
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third-party content. 177 These limitations on intermediary
immunity under CDA 230 simultaneously limit anti-SLAPP
protection.
In
addition
to
judicially-created
limitations,
any legislation creating exceptions to CDA 230 immunity
simultaneously limits anti-SLAPP protection. For instance, the
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of
2017 amended CDA 230 to exclude federal civil claims and
criminal charges and state criminal charges from the coverage of
immunity under CDA 230(c)(1). 178 This law was enacted largely
in reaction to conspicuous sex trafficking on Backpage.com, a
classified ads site whose operators some accused of not only
neglecting to prevent sex trafficking on the site but actively
protecting traffickers from law enforcement scrutiny. 179 Any
criminal charge or civil claim that falls within an exception to
CDA 230 immunity obviously would not be found meritless on
CDA 230 grounds for purposes of anti-SLAPP protection.
B. The “Matter of Public Concern” Limitation on Anti-SLAPP
Protection
Courts sometimes find that claims that lack merit because
of a CDA 230 defense nonetheless do not qualify for anti-SLAPP
protection because they do not touch on a matter of public
concern, as the second prong of anti-SLAPP analysis requires.
For instance, California courts sometimes distinguish online
consumer reviews that involve simply an individual customer’s
assessment of a vendor—a purportedly private matter—from
reviews that provide additional commentary on issues of interest
to the public, such as advice on how to choose a vendor within a
certain industry. 180 While CDA 230 immunity is virtually
guaranteed when a plaintiff attempts to hold a consumer review
website liable for tortious conduct by a consumer reviewer, antiSLAPP protection at the state level does not apply in all such
cases.
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A comparison of two California state court cases
illustrates this phenomenon. In Dunne v. Lara, a consumer posted
negative reviews of a particular dealership for Ducati
motorcycles on an online forum devoted to discussions
pertaining to this brand of motorcycles. 181 Specifically, this
consumer described the dealership’s service as “negligent” and
“substandard” and accused the dealership of illegal business
practices. 182 The owner of the dealership sued the commenter for
defamation, and the commenter in turn filed an anti-SLAPP
motion.183 The California Court of Appeal denied her motion,
finding that she “has not demonstrated the existence of any
widespread public debate.” Rather, her comments were “no
more than a report about Dunne’s business practices, of interest
only to Dunne’s customers and potential customers.” 184
In Navarro v. Cruz, by contrast, the California Court of
Appeal held that online reviews of a business qualified as
protected activity when their content touched on issues whose
importance transcended the particular dispute at issue. 185 A
teacher from the Philippines contracted with a placement
agency, UPI, that recruited and placed foreign teachers with
school systems in the United States. 186 She started a blog targeted
toward other Filipino migrants seeking to teach in U.S.
Schools. 187 She criticized UPI for charging extortionate fees and
defrauding foreign teachers, and for otherwise treating them
“virtually as modern slaves.” 188 UPI sued her for defamation. 189
The court found that her comments qualified as protected
activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because “the blog
addressed issues ranging beyond the specific wrongs and
breaches claimed to have been suffered by its writer, on issues
such as immigrant exploitation, fraud, and substandard
housing.” 190 Such issues, the court said, transcended the
defendant’s particular conflict with UPI: “[t]hese issues would
affect and would be of interest to many present and future
immigrant teachers-including not just those who had allegedly
been victimized, and not even just those who had actually
contracted with UPI, but also those who might be considering
becoming immigrant teachers through UPI or other such
181
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agencies.” 191 The defendant, the court concluded, “encourage[d]
others to stand up to pursue a common goal involving an
ongoing controversy.” 192
In the particular context of consumer reviews, this
limitation can be overcome by a provision in the statute
specifying that all speech pertaining to goods, products and
services constitutes protected activity. The Speak Free Act
specifically provides that statements about “a good, product, or
service in the marketplace” qualify as protected activity. 193
C. The Commercial Speech Exemption in a Federal Anti-SLAPP Law
A federal anti-SLAPP law should contain a commercial
speech exemption, and this exemption would preclude the
application of an anti-SLAPP defense in some cases in which
CDA 230 immunity applies. In California, prior to the passage
of CCP § 425.17, which added a commercial speech exemption
to California’s anti-SLAPP law through subsection (c), 194 antiSLAPP motions were often filed by defendants in false
advertising cases. In a case decided a few years before the
passage of the commercial speech exemption, DuPont Merck
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court, a class action against a
pharmaceutical company alleging deceptive marketing of a
blood-thinning medication, the court found that lobbying efforts
directed at legislators and regulators constituted protected
activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. The legislative
history of 425.17(c) quotes a statement by Professor of Sociology
Penelope Canan, who coined the acronym “SLAPP,” 195 in
which she notes the perversity of corporate defendants invoking
anti-SLAPP protection in the context of certain types of
consumer litigation: “Wealthy corporate defendants, some with
their own legal departments, simply do not suffer the chilling
effect on their rights when faced with a lawsuit claiming, for
example, false advertising or fraud or illegal business practices,
that common citizens suffer when sued for speaking out.” 196 In
false advertising cases subsequent to the enactment of the
commercial speech exemption, California courts have denied
corporate defendants the benefit of anti-SLAPP protection. 197
191
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Such an exemption is justifiable not only because it prevents the
abuse of anti-SLAPP protection by powerful private interests,
but also because limited rights attach to commercial speech
under the First Amendment, from which anti-SLAPP laws
derive their legitimacy. The Supreme Court has held that
content-based regulation of non-commercial speech is subject to
strict scrutiny—that is, regulation must be the least restrictive
means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. 198 By
contrast, the regulation of commercial speech must withstand
only intermediate scrutiny, meaning that a substantial
government interest must be served by the regulation, 199 and that
there must be only a “reasonable fit” between that purpose and
the means by which it is advanced. 200 While perhaps it is
arguable that a correspondingly intermediate level of antiSLAPP protection should apply to commercial speech, it also
seems clear that an equal level of anti-SLAPP protection for both
non-commercial and commercial speech is incongruous with the
First Amendment.
VIII. WHY NOT AMEND CDA 230 ITSELF?
The existence of gaps in the combined CDA 230-antiSLAPP defense might seem to suggest the wisdom of the cleaner
alternative of adding anti-SLAPP’s procedural protection to
CDA 230 itself. Indeed, one scholar, in confronting the problem
of pre-trial costs under CDA 230, has advocated adding a feeshifting provision to CDA 230. 201
But not only is this alternative solution politically
unrealistic; it also, even if politically achievable, would have
undesirable results. Adding a fee-shifting provision to CDA 230
is unrealistic at this moment in politics because CDA 230 is
embroiled in controversy over the phenomenon of online sex
trafficking on Backpage.com—a phenomenon thought by
proponents of the recently enacted Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act to be preventable but for CDA
230 immunity.202 But adding a fee-shifting provision, even if
within the commercial speech exemption); see also Metcalf v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 118
Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1266 (2004) (alleging misrepresentations in advertisements about
the size of storage units).
198
See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990);
Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987).
199
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
200
Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
201
See Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137 (2008).
202
See, e.g., Christopher White, New Anti-Sex Trafficking Legislation Lauded by U.S.
Catholic Leaders, CRUX (Mar. 23, 2018); see also 132 Stat. 1253 § 2(1) (“It is the sense
of Congress that [CDA 230] was never intended to provide legal protection to
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politically possible in spite of this climate, would be undesirable
for a different reason: unlike anti-SLAPP laws, CDA 230 has
many applications that advance freedom of commerce broadly
speaking, rather than freedom of speech.
The Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”) created an exception to
CDA 230 immunity for civil claims and criminal charges
pertaining to sex trafficking. 203 CDA 230 has long contained an
exception for federal criminal liability, 204 but FOSTA added an
exception for federal civil claims, as well as civil claims and
criminal charges under state law. 205 Backpage.com was a
classified ads website superficially designed, like Craiglist.com,
for a variety of types of commercial exchanges, but in fact widely
known as a hub for the purchase and sale of sexual services. 206
FOSTA was passed after a barrage of civil suits against
Backpage.com alleging that the operators of the site had ignored
or encouraged human trafficking by users were defeated by CDA
230 immunity. 207 The controversy surrounding Backpage.com
and public criticism of CDA 230 from legislators and from
within civil society likely has poisoned the well with respect to
any reform effort, such as the addition of a fee-shifting provision,
that would strengthen CDA 230 immunity in a broad fashion.
But even if adding a fee-shifting provision were politically
feasible, doing so would be undesirable, because it would
strengthen immunity in a manner that is overbroad from a First
Amendment perspective. The legal effect of this reform route
differs from that advocated in this Article with respect to two of
the three limitations mentioned in Part VII. Statutory and
judicial limitations to CDA 230 immunity would limit the
application of a fee-shifting provision in CDA 230 just as much
as the application of a fee-shifting provision added externally by
a federal anti-SLAPP law. The direct amendment of CDA 230,
however, would tip the scales in favor of defendants in cases
involving commercial speech, such as false advertising class
actions against corporate defendants. This would amount to a
form of tort reform beyond the purview of the First Amendment
websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that
facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking
victims[.]”).
203
132 Stat. 1253.
204
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2018).
205
See id. § 4(a).
206
Ana Valens, What is Backpage, and Why Did It Shut Down, DAILY DOT (May 25,
2018), https://www.dailydot.com/irl/what-is-backpage/.
207
See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, L.L.C., 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016);
Backpage.com, L.L.C. v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1286−87 (W.D. Wash.
2012); Backpage.com, L.L.C. v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 823 (M.D. Tenn.
2013).
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because the commercial speech exemption in anti-SLAPP laws
has a basis in First Amendment doctrine. 208
Admittedly, the “matter of public concern” limitation on
anti-SLAPP protection provides for narrower protection than
that justified by the First Amendment; and this limitation could
be avoided by adding a fee-shifting provision to CDA 230 itself.
The First Amendment applies in private tort lawsuits regardless
of whether the content of allegedly tortious speech concerns a
public or private matter. By contrast, as discussed, 209 speech with
purely private significance does not qualify for anti-SLAPP
protection.
But a proper balance between two values—access to
justice and freedom of speech—counsels in favor of the reform
route advocated in this Article. First, as mentioned, in the
specific context of consumer reviews, the limiting effect of the
“matter of public concern” requirement can be eliminated by
specifying that statements about goods and services constitute
protected activity. Second, if California case law is any guide, the
category of activities that satisfy this requirement is expansive:
most online comments can be portrayed as somehow touching
on an issue of public importance by a court predisposed to find
as much. 210 Adding a fee-shifting provision to CDA 230 itself, in
order to preclude the narrow subset of cases in which online
speech touches on purely private matters, would come at the
significant cost of systematically disadvantaging plaintiffs in a
variety lawsuits against intermediaries in which freedom of
speech concerns are not implicated.
CONCLUSION
A federal anti-SLAPP law would supplement CDA 230’s
substantive immunity for online intermediaries with certain
procedural mechanisms designed to address the collateral
chilling effects of pre-trial costs. Specifically, a federal antiSLAPP law would provide defendant speech distributors with a
fee-shifting mechanism, a guarantee of speedy dismissal, and a
means of preventing discovery in meritless cases. Codifying antiSLAPP protection at the federal level would provide this
enhanced protection in a broader range of CDA 230 cases than
is covered under the current regime of state anti-SLAPP laws.
This antidote to the speech-chilling effect of pre-trial costs in
CDA 230 cases is more politically feasible than adding a feeshifting provision to CDA 230 itself, in the current political
208

See supra Part VII(c).
See supra Part VII(b).
210
See supra Part III(d).
209
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climate. But further, this method of reform is more desirable,
because it is more narrowly directed at protecting the rights of
speech and petition, as opposed to serving as a broad instrument
of tort reform.

